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Context 
 
This work corresponded to a study managed by FAO in connection with the project entitled 
"Enhancement of coffee quality through prevention of mould formation", intended to assess 
the degree of OTA contamination in coffee, and possible solutions adapted to each local 
context in 8 countries. For Indonesia, the project was drawn up and implemented jointly by 
ICCRI, CIRAD and the national consultant from LRPI, W.R. Susila. 
 
Three socio-economic studies were selected by ICCRI and FAO in February/March 2004. 
CIRAD was not involved at that stage, but was able to fine-tune the study protocols in May 
2004. 
 
The three studies were as follows: 
 
1) Targeted Investigation of Robusta Coffee Processing and Marketing Chain in 
Lampung, 
2) Study of the adoption of the wet process in Pupuan-Bali and feasibility of the 
introduction of wet processing in East Java, 
3) Targeted study of the Arabica coffee production chain in North Sumatra (Mandheling 
Coffee). 
 
Five documents were produced on those 3 studies: 
 
1) Targeted Investigation of Robusta Coffee Processing and Marketing Chain in 
Lampung, W.R. Susila, National Consultant, 
2) Investigation of the feasibility of wet processed Robusta by Smallholder Farmers in 
East Java, W. R. Susila, National Consultant, 
3) Targeted Study of the Arabica Coffee Production Chain in North Sumatra (The 
Mandheling Coffee), W. R. Susila, National Consultant, 
4) Study on the Robusta coffee production chain in Lampung: Analysis of the "Nestlé 
project" for the prevention of moulds responsible for ochratoxin A contamination. A. 
F. Ruscassie, B. Sallée, E. Cheyns, CIRAD, and 
5) This overview based on studies 1 and 2 only. 
 
 
Research issues 
 
In theory, where OTA are concerned, the reasoning of the Indonesian coffee supply chain is 
based on the following hypotheses: 
 
- When EU1 norm projects were considering a maximum limit of 5 ppb in green coffee, 
studies estimated the risk of contaminated batches at under 5%, far behind certain 
other rivals on the robusta market,  
- The 5 ppb norms in roasted coffee still substantially minimize that risk, since less 
OTA is systematically measured in roasted coffee than in the green coffee sample 
from which it comes (at least 70 to 80% on average2), 
                                                 
1 European Union 
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- Yet, "risky" conditions and practices on farms and in the supply chain are clear: 
shoddy harvesting, a great deal of rainfall during the harvesting period, nonexistent or 
very rudimentary drying equipment, marketing up to the exporter with a high moisture 
content (18 to 20% on average), possible long storage at different levels, by farmers 
for cash-flow reasons, by middlemen and traders to acquire a sufficient volume or to 
speculate, etc. 
 
This contradictory situation led the relevant authorities and the Indonesian research institute 
to make the following statements: 
 
- In theory, the Indonesian coffee supply chain will only be slightly affected, if at all, 
since international roasters need robusta and the probability of having contaminated 
batches is greater with the other "origins", 
- Yet, vigilance is called for, and risks should be minimized as much as possible. 
- In order for farmers to adopt the best practices, particularly when drying, it is essential 
to obtain a quality premium making it possible either to envisage investment, or to 
compensate for the increase in production costs. 
 
ICCRI therefore proposed these 2 studies, on the robusta supply chain in Lampung and on the 
switch to wet processing in East Java, which corresponded to this strategy: 
 
- Initially, in Lampung, it was a matter of assessing the efficiency and reproducibility of 
introducing quality premiums for farmers, based on two objective criteria: moisture 
content and number of defects. That system is currently in place in a supply chain 
commonly known as the "Nestlé supply chain". 
- In the second case, innovation mostly focuses on technology, with the adoption of 
robusta wet processing, hence with a potential premium for the end product. In order 
to propose that change in East Java, ICCRI suggested carrying out an 
analysis/overview at Pupuan (Bali) where that technology was introduced in 2002 and, 
on that basis, assessing the feasibility of that innovation in a distinct context (East 
Java). 
 
Theoretically, in both cases, the risks of OTA contamination were minimized and farmers 
were better remunerated. 
 
Lastly, this overview ends with some thoughts on the consequences for stakeholders in the 
Indonesian robusta supply chain of the EU introducing OTA norms. 
                                                                                                                                                        
2 This involves measurement differences. It seemed to be attributed to OTA degradation during roasting, but 
recent studies prove that there is indeed OTA degradation but also "masking" in biochemical complexes, which 
the analysis methods in the norms cannot measure. 
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1. Study of the "Nestlé" robusta supply chain in Lampung 
 
Only the most notable results from the documents (1 and 4, see page 2) are indicated here. 
The detailed analysis of the supply chains and production systems can be found in those 
documents. 
 
1.1. Analysis/Overview of the "Nestlé" system 
 
For farmers
 
For farmers, it was a matter of producing green coffee with a moisture content under 12% and 
fewer than 120 defects. Two options were possible: 
 
- Either wash and sort green coffee obtained conventionally, 
- Or use practices that minimized the number of defects (in particular, selective 
harvesting), and improved drying. 
 
Most of the farmers involved in the Nestlé project went for the first option, which was 
reflected in a work overload for drying and sorting, a loss of weight estimated at between 14 
and 27% (loss in water and weight of defects) and slightly deferred payment (5 to 7 days). 
Farmers therefore needed to be able to cover the extra work and not be forced into rapid or 
conditioned sales (sale for credit repayment) in cash-flow terms.  
 
Analyses showed that not all the farmers had the same possibilities of adopting the Nestlé 
system. 
 
Table 1: Criteria governing adoption of the Nestlé system by type of farmer 
 
 Cash-flow level 
at the start of 
harvesting 
Labour 
availability 
Accessibility to 
cooperative 
sales 
Possibility of 
adopting 
Nestlé system 
Type 1 Negative to zero Low Low Very difficult 
Type 2A Very low Average Average Difficult 
Type 2B Low Average High Possible 
Type 3 Low High High Possible 
Type 4 High High High Possible 
 
These types of farmers are summed up in the following table: 
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Table 2: Differentiation between types of farmers 
 
 Area Investment 
capacity 
Type of 
labour in 
plantation 
Work on 
another 
plantation 
Level of diversification 
as a % of agricultural 
earnings not from 
coffee 
Drying 
method 
Level of 
schooling
Type 1 0.5 to 1 ha none Family Compulsory 30% Bare soil Low 
Type 2 A 1 to 2 ha very low Family Optional 50% Bare soil Low 
Type 2 B 1 to 2 ha low Family Optional 50% Bare soil Average 
Type 3 2 to 5 ha low Family and 
hired 
None 40% Bare soil-
cemented 
area 
Average 
Type 4 > 5ha high Hired None 20% Cemented 
area 
Average 
The discriminant criteria for this typology were: the area planted to coffee, the capital level, 
the employment of hired labour, and the level of schooling. The differentiation between types 
2A and 2B came from the level of schooling. In general, the "2B" farmers, with better 
schooling, had a secondary activity enabling them to take certain risks. 
 
On a sample of 90 farmers, the distribution of types was as follows: 
 
Distribution of sample by  types
40%
41%
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6% 4%
type 1
type 2 A
type 2 B
type 3
type 4
 
 
Figure 1: Distribution by types of the 90 farmers interviewed 
 
Thus, only 19% of farmers adopted the Nestlé system. 
 
Cash-flow, and as a corollary, income diversification, was one factor explaining the adoption 
of the Nestlé system. An analysis of the data (figures 8, 9 and 10 of document 4, see page 2) 
clearly showed that.  
 
Its merits in economic terms were not obvious to farmers. The premium was real but it had to 
at least compensate for weight losses and extra costs. The farmers felt that the premium ought 
to amount to at least 30% of the price of traditional quality (called asalan). For average basic 
production of 800 kg of wet hulled unsorted coffee3, overall farmer income increased, but the 
income per day's work could be lower.  
  
                                                 
3 This is average production for type 1 and type 2 producers. 
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Table 3: Comparison of earnings and work output between the traditional system and the Nestlé 
system for a price difference of Rp 1200 
 
 
 Traditional system Nestlé system (family labour) Nestlé system (hired labour) 
Volume sold in  
kg 
800 kg 688 to 584 kg 
 
688 to 584 kg 
 
Sale price Rp 4000/kg Rp 5200/kg Rp 5200/kg 
Result  Rp 3 200 000 Rp 3 270 000 to Rp 3 660 000 
(Nestlé sale + defects) 
Rp 3 270 000 to Rp 3 660 000 
Income Rp 2 980 000 Rp 3 050 000 to Rp 3 440 000 Rp 2 890 000 to Rp 3 280 000 
Labour provided 92 man-days 108 man-days 
Income/day's 
work 
Rp 32 400/man-day Rp 28 200 to Rp 32 000/man-
day 
Lastly, only farmers near the cooperative created for this supply chain (KUB) produced the 
quality required by Nestlé. This was a classic result in the organizational environment. 
Involvement in the cooperative was an explanatory factor. 
 
For the supply chain 
 
The studies revealed three main results: 
 
- The Nestlé system was very worthwhile for middlemen and traders,  
- Introduction of this system made it possible to generalize objective quality criteria 
(moisture content and % of defects) even in the traditional supply chain and, 
- The Nestlé project made it possible to strengthen or create farmer organizations. 
 
A comparison of the advantages for the different stakeholders in the supply chain is given in 
the following table: 
 
Table 4: Comparison of incomes for a farmer, a middleman and a trader in the traditional and Nestlé 
supply chains 
 
 Farmer (800 kg) Middleman (50 t) Trader (500 t) 
Income in the traditional supply 
chain (in 000 Rp) 2 980 6 500 25 000 
Income in the Nestlé supply chain 
(in 000 Rp) 3 050 à 3 440 7 500 à 14 500 40 000 à 80 000 
% increase in profits due to the 
Nestlé system 2 to 15% 15 to 120% 60 to 220% 
 
This partly explains why the Nestlé project, which was originally planned with direct 
purchasing from farmers, gradually turned to middlemen and traders for its raw material 
supplies. 
 
Generalization of "Cera Tester" moisture meters and the estimation (sometimes measurement) 
of defects in the traditional supply chain were an improvement that could be attributed to the 
creation of the Nestlé supply chain. Visual and tactile estimation was still generalized in 
contracts between farmers and middlemen, but objective criteria were beginning to be 
introduced. 
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Lastly, it was undeniable that the Nestlé project had helped to strengthen farmer organizations 
in Ngarip, in the founding village, but also in the region. 
 
For the prevention of mould formation 
 
The Nestlé system enabled better control of mould formation than in the traditional supply 
chain. We took as the main criteria the time between harvesting and green coffee beans at a 
12% moisture level, when water activity no longer enabled growth of Aspergillus spp., which 
is responsible for ochratoxin A production.  
 
When Nestlé bought coffee directly at 12% moisture from farmers, that duration was 
minimized. But such cases were increasingly infrequent. 
When Nestlé bought from its trader, who himself obtained supplies from farmers and 
middlemen, the duration was undetermined as the background of the coffee was unknown. In 
order to avoid that problem, Nestlé only bought coffee via that supply chain during the 
harvest period. That measure also partly explained why the instant coffee production factory, 
which had to work all year round, only purchased a small share of its requirements via that 
supply chain. 
 
That duration was studied in the particular case of coffee from Ngarip, in the traditional 
supply chain and in the case of direct purchasing from farmers. 
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Figure 2: Change in moisture content over time depending on coffee circuit in the supply chain 
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The moisture rates and number of defects in samples taken from stakeholders in the supply 
chain were as follows: 
 
Table 5: Moisture Content and Defects at various stakeholder levels 
 
MC Defects 
Stakeholder 
Average (%) CV (%) Average CV (%) 
Farmer 19.43 13.94 210.61 91.66 
Middleman 19.08 10.56 189.00 47.35 
Trader 17.77 8.85 140.24 26.58 
Exporter 12.73 5.89 57.88 20.09 
MC : Moisture Content 
CV : Coefficient of Variation 
These data clearly show that final coffee drying to 12% was mostly carried out by exporters. 
All in all, the middlemen played a very limited drying role, since the moisture content varied 
very little up to the exporter. However, those stakeholders "homogenized" the coffee by 
mixing yields of different origins; the coefficient of variation clearly showed that. 
 
In the traditional supply chain, farmers could store their coffee with a high moisture rate, for 
cash-flow purposes. Middlemen thus received coffee up to the end of October (for a harvest 
mostly in June and July). Each actor in the middleman, trader, exporter sector could thus store 
coffee to build up batches, to speculate, etc. The following figures illustrate this storage 
function. 
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Figure 3: Annual distributions for the sales of a middleman and of a trader and volumes exported in 
Lampung 
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In addition, in order to achieve a minimum of defects, the stakeholders in the Nestlé supply 
chain had to carry out sorting. For example, farmers who sold directly to Nestlé, passed their 
coffee twice through a huller, before re-drying and sorting by hand again. Manual sorting and 
winnowing was seen among middlemen (see photo 20, document 4). Nestlé traders even used 
densimetric sorting. All these operations made it possible to remove potential sources of 
ochratoxins, particularly bits of shell debris which were the most contaminated. 
 
OTA analyses carried out on farms and throughout the Nestlé and traditional supply chains 
did not enable any significant difference to be measured between the supply chains, as the 
ochratoxin contents measured were extremely low in all cases. 
 
 
1.2. Reproducibility of the system 
 
The Nestlé system was difficult to reproduce, for many reasons. The main three are indicated 
below. 
 
Firstly, Nestlé is a roaster, an instant coffee producer. To obtain its raw material, the factory 
traditionally called upon local exporters, who prepared coffee for it in accordance with its 
conditions.  Commercial benefit was derived from instant coffee sales and exports. In order 
for another stakeholder in the supply chain to play that role, it would be necessary to be at the 
same level in the supply chain, i.e. that its activity be centred on roasting. Exporters could not 
afford to adopt the same strategy, since it would mean transferring the drying and sorting 
activity upstream and thereby losing its benefits. However, the other national roasters did not 
have the same strategy as Nestlé regarding their image of being associated with coffee safety 
and did not therefore wish to risk making purchases further upstream, which would only lead 
to problems. Neither did they have the infrastructure available to Nestlé (programme 
manager, technicians, trial plots, etc.).  
 
Secondly, the demand from buying centres and international roasters was centred on low price 
markets/volumes. Even the lower grades, notably 20/254, were sold without any problems 
unblended, at a low price. For exporters, there was no demand for quality coffee. 
Consequently, they could not consider passing on quality premiums to farmers. Only 
exporters linked to international groups had access to very narrow special markets: quality 
wet processed robusta, peaberries, extra large beans (or ELB), etc. For most of those markets 
(especially ELB and peaberries), only exporters could prepare a batch by sorting a very large 
volume, bought from farmers via the traditional supply chain. For wet processed robusta, or 
good quality high altitude dry processed robusta, exporters might have markets and organize 
supplies under contract with farmers or traders. That was the case for the wet processed 
robusta market at Pupuan in Bali which will be discussed in part 2. But all those markets 
remained very limited and only involved very few farmers.  
 
Thirdly, most of the stakeholders met in the supply chain, notably exporters, considered that 
the Nestlé system was not really worthwhile for farmers, which tallied with our analyses. 
They felt that the Nestlé company could invest in that type of innovation because experience 
of localized rural development, with direct buying from farmers, served its image perfectly. 
 
                                                 
4 This was green coffee with between 20 and 25% of its weight in defects. 
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1.3. Opportunities for change 
 
The studies tallied: the Nestlé system was a step forward in the organization of subsectors 
based on the production of symbolic and/or material attributes. The authors proposed relying 
on those fledgling organizations to propose strategies working towards that: switch to wet 
processing, production and sale of roasted coffee, fair trade, etc. It was a logical result. In fact 
research showed that most of the value of the coffee sold to consumers was procured by 
stakeholders who sold symbolic and service attributes: roaster brands, fair trade and organic 
coffees, coffee chains such as Starbucks, café owners, etc. However, stakeholders whose 
contracts were based on the "material" attributes of coffee, such as physical or sensory 
characteristics, only shared a small percentage of the end-value. The traditional supply chain 
and the Nestlé supply chain in Lampung were based on material attributes. If farmers wished 
to obtain better remuneration for their coffee, and therefore take more care in its preparation, 
they had to produce and sell symbolic attributes. The options proposed by the authors, roasted 
coffee on the domestic market and fair trade coffee (of the FLO International type)5, work 
towards that. 
 
                                                 
5 Fair Trade Labelling Organization 
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2. Adopting wet processing in Bali and East Java 
 
In this study, it was necessary to: 
 
- Carry out an overview of the switch to wet processing launched in Bali in 2002 and,  
- Study conditions for reproducing that project in East Java. 
 
2.1. Wet processing in Bali 
 
For farmers at Pupuan in Bali, the switch from dry coffee processing to wet processing was a 
success. Farmers were better remunerated and easily adopted wet processing. 
 
The key factors for that success were: 
 
a) Access to the wet processed robusta market via ICCRI and the exporter PT Indo 
CafCo. That exporter guaranteed a minimum purchasing price to farmers. 
 
Table 6: Comparison of selling prices for dry and wet processed coffees 
 
 2003 2004 
Minimum price guaranteed to 
farmers by the exporter Rp 5600/kg Rp 6750/kg 
Price of dry processed coffee Rp 4800/kg Rp 5200/kg 
b) Substantial and well-organized technical supervision by ICCRI and the Dinas 
Perkebunan extension service, 
 
c) An effective farmer organization system. Farmers belonged to Subak Abian, a highly 
structuring social and religious organization in Bali. Projects were discussed and 
adopted within that context. It was a very efficient form of appropriation. 
 
d) The existence of acknowledged leaders, in the Subak Abian, in charge of the project 
and of innovation, and 
 
e) Local government support. 
 
This last point was fundamental in the economic studies. The investments required to fund 
processing equipment and buildings came from the Bali province, amounting to Rp 175 
million. If the farmers had had to cover the costs of installation, it could be considered that the 
processing price would have trebled. In fact, if the factory were amortized over 10 years, it 
would have been necessary to add Rp 17.5 million each harvesting season. In that simulation, 
the possible repayment of interest on loans was not taken into account, it was considered that 
farmers could fund themselves and had access to interest-free loans. 
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Table 7: Processing costs for 100 kg of cherries depending on the funding method 
 
 Public funding of installations Amortization by farmers over 10 years 
Annual operating costs Rp 10 million Rp 10 million 
Initial investment spread over 
10 years Rp 0 Rp 17.5 million 
Total Rp 10 million Rp 27.5 million 
Cost of processing 100 kg of 
cherries Rp 11 000 Rp 30 250 
 
Thus, profits calculated on an average basis of 4 tonnes of cherries would be as follows: 
 
Table 8: Comparison of profits from wet and dry processing 
 
 Dry processing  ( 4 t in DP) 
Wet processing 
 (4t in WP) 
Wet processing 
with amortization 
Profits in Rp 4 880 000 5 610 000 4 840 000 
% increase/dry 
method  14 % -1% 
 
In health terms, wet processing is usually less risky than dry processing. Ochratoxin 
measurements were carried out on 4 wet processed samples and 6 dry processed samples. The 
results showed that dry processed coffee had very low OTA levels (average of 0.14 ppb). The 
wet processed samples were OTA-free. 
 
The ongoing technical problem with wet processing was the adherence of silverskin to the 
bean. This was not a defect under local classification (or of the Green Coffee Association), 
but the appearance of the coffee was not optimum, even after going through a polisher. As the 
high premium market targeted was based on quality, the problem needed to be solved by 
ICCRI with the farmers. 
 
2.2. Reproducibility of the innovation in East Java 
 
The feasibility study for introducing wet processing among smallholders focused on 4 
aspects: technical, organizational, commercial and economic. 
 
Technically, the farmers at Garahan in East Java had a problem in adapting processing 
equipment; they considered that the equipment proposed in Bali was not appropriate since it 
consumed too much water, and that the pulpers traditionally used in North Sumatra (hand 
pulpers) had too small a capacity that did not match the high cost of labour in East Java. 
Farmers wanted medium-scale equipment (around 250 kg of cherries/hour) which was mobile 
and motorized, and which combined pulping and washing operations. ICCRI was called upon 
for this point. 
 
Organizationally, farmers in East Java did not benefit from the traditional structure existing in 
Bali. However, they worked in groups for certain activities and tended, as in Bali, to accord a 
religious dimension to their organization. However, the farmers were aware of their lack of 
organization and pinpointed their weaknesses, on which training could be based: strategy and 
programming, leadership, relations between quality and premiums. 
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For the market, studies showed that East Java was traditionally a producer of washed robusta 
coffee (wet processing) of a quality known under the name of WIB (West Indische Bereiding). 
That coffee was produced on the large State farms or private estates. For economic reasons 
(high labour costs and low coffee prices) that production has been partly abandoned. 
 
Table 9: Export of Robusta coffee from East Java (in tonnes) 
 
Coffee Type 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Robusta (37,159) (30,794) (32,686) (33,098) (32,967) 
Wet Process 11,166 10,306 9,035 8,590 6,848 
Dry Process 25,993 20,488 23,651 24,508 26,119 
 
There was therefore an opportunity for organized farmers to take over from the estates, 
though it would be necessary to produce impeccable quality similar to that supplied by those 
estates.  
 
Economically, the studies showed that, under current conditions (dry processing price at 
Rp 5250/kg), the premium obtained with wet processing needed to be at least 33% of that 
price, the ideal being premiums ranging from 37 to 52% of the price of a kg of dry processed 
coffee. 
 
2.3. Conclusion 
 
Switching from dry robusta processing to wet robusta processing has been a success in Bali 
and is "feasible" under other conditions. However, it is necessary to be able to count on: 
 
- A known, targeted market, and an exporter interested in marketing that type of coffee,  
- An efficient and structured farmer organization, 
- Technical support and,   
- Financial support. 
 
In terms of coffee health quality, wet processing is an effective way of processing coffee to 
avoid mould formation. Access to a limited but demanding market is also guaranteed. 
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3. Conclusions of the studies and effect of introducing OTA 
norms on the Indonesian robusta coffee supply chain  
 
The socio-economic studies conducted in Indonesia showed that "supply chain" or 
technological solutions that would enable farmers to obtain better remuneration for their 
production in return for an improvement in the quality of the coffee produced, are "feasible" 
under certain conditions. 
 
A quality premium is possible for dry processed robusta if a dominant stakeholder in the 
supply chain (exporter, Nestlé, AEKI6, etc.) opens up a market and creates a subsector with 
remuneration based on objective attributes: moisture content and defects are good criteria. 
However, such an initiative is not easy to establish. Only exporters linked to large 
international trading groups can allow themselves such a risk. It will also be necessary to be 
able to count on serious farmer organizations from which exporters can procure supplies 
under contract in accordance with specifications. In addition, it will be necessary for the 
quality premium to compensate largely for weight losses and the extra costs associated with 
producing the required attributes. Lastly, those organizations should be able to count on 
financial backing to create working capital and overcome farmer dependency on loans often 
provided by middlemen. 
 
A quality premium exists for wet processed robusta. In theory, Indonesia had a lucrative 
market for that type of product. But, here again, the success of that innovation involves the 
existence of an efficient organizational structure and financial support for investments and 
working capital. The technical problems ought to be overcome without any major difficulty. 
 
In all the analyses carried out in Lampung, Bali and East Java, OTA rates were very low, 
corroborating the first results obtained. Despite risky practices, Indonesian coffee is little 
affected by this problem. According to the main people involved, exporters, it would be 
enough to strictly forbid the export of coffee from the previous harvest to further minimize 
that risk. 
 
The norms introduced by the EU concern roasted and instant coffee, i.e. those norms transfer 
the responsibility of checking for OTA contamination to roasters and European 
manufacturers.  
 
Those stakeholders are prepared and have been working on health quality for several years. 
They know that readings on roasted coffee are 50 to 80% lower than on the green coffees 
from which they are made. They can therefore bank on a maximum of 10-12 ppb in green 
coffee, given that they can further blend healthy and contaminated coffee prior to roasting and 
thereby "dilute" OTA. Under such conditions, coffee buyers will be more suspicious of only a 
few, well-known sources. Indonesia is not one of them. The global tendency is therefore 
likely to favour Indonesian robusta coffee. However, it is difficult to envisage a health 
premium; it seems more likely that the market will apply a discount to risky origins, at least to 
compensate for analysis costs. 
 
Indonesian exporters will remain worried, because their clients will bring in more and more 
checks, under pressure from the "precaution principle" of European consumers. 
 
                                                 
6 Association of Indonesian coffee exporters. 
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Exporters linked to large international trading companies are usually the first to react because 
information circulates better among them, and pressure from buyers is more present. They 
would need to secure their supplies by checking traders' batches and set in place a norm for 
rejecting the oldest coffees with most defects.  
 
National exporters will also be under pressure, but they are less well informed and relatively 
at a loss with regard to the problem. Eventually, they would need to adopt similar measures to 
international exporters and sell doubtful batches on less discerning markets. 
 
In all cases, it is not very likely that  a health quality premium will be paid upstream in the 
supply chain unless one is received from their customers. Here again, one can merely imagine 
a large discount for the most dubious coffees. 
 
Middlemen have no reason to move if exporters do not modify their remuneration system. In 
the case of rejected coffees, they will apply discounts. Hence, no impact on farmers. 
 
However, the system could evolve towards the emergence of a few initiatives on 
differentiated markets, wet processed coffee, roasted coffee, fair trade and/or organic coffee, 
with quality premiums encompassing a health aspect. Such initiatives, which require heavy 
human investment, will only slightly affect farmers. 
 
In order to potentially affect the majority of farmers, it would be necessary for one main 
stakeholder to push for a more evident remuneration of quality upstream for more 
differentiated supplies downstream. Very logically, exporters would have to play a major role 
in such a reform, notably their association AEKI. The State also has a preponderant role to 
play in providing impetus, as W. Susila highlighted on several occasions.    
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